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Until the last few years, interpretive and Darwinian, selectionist, or 
evolutionary archaeologies have not had a troubled or adversarial relationship; rather, 
they have had very little relationship at all. Their visions of archaeology appear to be 
poles apart; the style and tone of the writings of either school are, it would seem at 
first appearance, like chalk and cheese. If the last twenty years have seen a growing 
diversity and fragmentation of archaeological theory, then one artefact of that 
fragmentation has been a lack of dialogue between different fragments. Scholars 
engage in ‘redlining’ of large areas of archaeological theory (Kristiansen 2004). 
Where the 1980s saw furious arguments at conferences, the first decade of the 21st 
century is more likely to see polished papers in parallel sessions delivered to the 
already converted. 
Until invited to write this chapter, I had had little contact with the current 
literature on Darwinian or evolutionary archaeology. Selection of areas of expertise is 
always necessary, particularly given the necessarily open-ended and interdisciplinary 
nature of theory (“…to admit the importance of theory is to make an open-ended 
commitment, to leave yourself in a position where there are always things you don’t 
know”, Culler 1997: 16), but the contrast can be drawn with the very rich and 
productive intellectual space that connects interpretive archaeologies with cultural 
evolutionary theory, that is, the theoretical tradition stemming from the social thought of Spencer rather than the biological thinking of Darwin, which characterises and 
classifies social life in chiefdoms and states. In this latter field, there has been an 
extensive and often productive dialogue with postprocessual thinking, as seen for 
example in discussions of power, materiality, heterarchy and related concepts, and 
which often relates themes such as gender and structuration theory to questions of 
social process and state formation (cf. various in Brumfiel and Fox 1994; Crumley 
and Levy 1995; DeMarrais, Gosden and Renfrew 2004; Hegmon 2003; Beck et al. 
2007). In a vulgarised conception of theory, traditions of cultural evolution stand in 
greater proximity to interpretive ideas than does Darwinian evolution. If this edited 
volume achieves one thing, it may be to show this perceived lack of proximity 
between Darwinian and interpretive approaches to be at best an oversimplification 
and at worst misleading. 
In this chapter, I want to outline a few elements of the goals and intellectual 
aims of archaeology as a discipline. My perspective is broadly an interpretive one, 
though I want to draw out some common elements and themes, and make some 
critical remarks about interpretive and other approaches along the way. In particular, I 
want to grapple with archaeology’s aspirations. Archaeologists claim to be able to 
understand and account for the past in an empirically and theoretically rigorous way, 
to reach out beyond the material traces of the past to past cultural life. While 
interpretive archaeology has been glossed by many of its detractors as abandoning 
these claims in the face of a disabling plurality of views of the past, I have never 
accepted such an analysis. In this paper, I want to re-assert these claims, and more 
broadly to re-assert the roles and responsibilities of archaeology as a serious social 
science. I will develop this position by responding particularly to positions and 
statements found in Stephen Shennan’s book Genes, Memes and Human History 
(Shennan 2002), and to Shennan’s paper in this book. Central to the position I want to 
develop will be a revisiting of the 19th century, both in terms of the intellectual 
genesis of modern archaeology, and in terms of the social and historical context of the 
thought of Charles Darwin. 
 
H1 The entangled bank 
Shennan throws down a challenge at the end of his book which I would like to 
take up: 
“On the last page of On The Origin of Species Darwin famously asked his 
reader ‘to contemplate an entangled bank, with birds singing in the bushes, 
with various insects flitting about, and to reflect that these elaborately 
constructed forms, so different from each other and dependent on each other in 
so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us’. It is 
time for archaeologists to stop being beguiled by the complexities of their own 
entangled banks and to start producing accounts of human history that make 
use of the principles Darwin established” (Shennan 2002: 271). 
This is a powerful plea with which I have much sympathy. However, the 
target of Shennan’s comment is in my view misplaced. Throwing one’s hands up at 
the complexity of the bank is not a position easily identified with interpretive 
archaeologies; when interpretive traditions protest against what they see as excessive 
reductionism, the alternative proposed is never simply to allow oneself to be beguiled 
by complexity. Rather, being beguiled by complexity is a position of mindless 
particularism, of the accumulation of data devoid of an explicit theoretical framework. Such an inductive particularism can only be intellectually credible if allied to the 
expectation that a future generation will put all the pieces together, or to a naïve 
empiricism in which no theoretical labour is needed as the data will simply speak for 
themselves. Such an explicit position ran out of intellectual steam a long time ago, but 
is still regrettably common in much of traditional archaeology and continues to drive 
much archaeological enquiry at an implicit and untheorised level (I discuss this 
continuing empiricism in Johnson 2007 and 2010). 
The interpretive response is actually very different. It is (at least for this 
author) to re-frame the challenge – in this case, to ask questions about Darwin’s and 
Shennan’s very powerful image: to engage with the historicity of the entangled bank. 
I am going to argue in what follows that a central terrain of engagement between 
interpretive and Darwinist archaeologies is the 19
th century historical context of 
Darwin’s ideas. When understood in their context, these ideas are actually central to 
an understanding of their application to archaeology now and in the future, though not 
necessarily for the reasons Darwinian archaeologists themselves choose to put 
forward. 
The interpretive response starts by decentering the claims to a ‘scientific’ 
superiority made by Darwinian archaeologists. Before the ‘discovery’ of genetics, 
evolutionary theory had a quite tenuous claim to completeness and rigour. There was 
a central element to its arguments that remained quite unverifiable – it could not grasp 
the central question of the source of variation in the natural world. The missing 
element was genetics. The genetic causes of variation in the natural world were not 
known to Darwin, and would not be integrated into evolutionary theory until the early 
20
th century rediscovery of Mendel’s work on genetics. It can be argued that his 
theory was incomplete. The literary and cultural critic Gillian Beer (2000: xviii) makes the point that 19
th century Darwinism was ‘poised on the edge of metaphor’ 
because the genetic basis of variation was not known. 
Darwin’s use of the image of the bank, then, was rhetorical, allusive and 
literary and must be understood in those terms. Indeed, it is commonplace to assert 
that Darwin cannot be understood without understanding the literary construction of 
his books:  there is an extensive discussion on the relationship between 19
th century 
evolution and literature (for example Beer 1996a; 1996b; 2000). In possibly his most 
well-known passage from The Descent of Man, Darwin famously uses literary 
devices, including a portrayal of early humans as devils or imps, to make his point: 
“The various facts … have been given in the previous chapters. The early 
progenitors of man were no doubt covered with hair, both sexes having 
beards; their ears were pointed and capable of movement; and their bodies 
were provided with a tail … our progenitors, no doubt, were arboreal in their 
habits, frequenting some warm, forest-clad land. The males were provided 
with great canine teeth, which served them as formidable weapons” (Wilson 
2006: 894). 
Observation of a central role to rhetoric and allusion in Darwin’s work, and of 
missing elements, does not make it somehow less ‘scientific’. After all, the history of 
science is replete with famous narratives featuring politics, passion, and personal 
rivalry (the discovery of the structure of DNA; Galileo’s decision to write in Italian 
rather than Latin to appeal to a wider audience; Friedrich Kekulé’s ‘daydream’ in 
which he ‘discovered’ the structure of benzene [Wilcox and Greenbaum 1965]). What 
it does do is to decenter the notion that there is a single way to do science, and that 
there is a straightforward and fundamental distinction to be made between the 
methods of Science and those of non-science. After all, Darwinian archaeologists themselves have debated the notion of Darwinian explanation as metaphor (Bamforth 
2002; O’Brien and Leonard 2003; Bamforth 2003). If metaphor is an unacknowledged 
but nevertheless central element to Darwinian archaeology, then Darwinian 
archaeology remains a valid project, but it must give up the high ground: Darwinian 
claims to be producing materially better explanations than their fluffy humanist 
counterparts must be severely eroded. Such a point is familiar, even uncontroversial in 
many circles; however, I am going to go on to argue that one of the least attractive 
aspects of modern Darwinian archaeology is its (rhetorical) assertion of just such a 
‘scientific’ high ground and its (rhetorical) denigration of others as standing outside 
this ground. 
So the way is open to the asking the classic question of the interpretive turn – 
the question that directs us to the intellectual, cultural and political framing of any 
given set of ideas – in other words, to context: why did Darwin choose the image of 
the entangled bank? 
Darwin’s image is historically particular. You get entangled banks in the 
temperate surroundings of the English countryside, not, arguably, around the plains, 
deserts and rain forests of the world. Recent scholarship has emphasised how the 
material for Darwin’s insights came from the local, English landscape just as much as 
his better known voyage in the Beagle (Boulter 2008). There is no obvious physical 
correlate for his bank, unfortunately (such was the impact of Darwin’s image that 
other writers imagined themselves to be looking at just such a bank in other parts of 
the country, for example Williams-Freeman’s pioneering work on field archaeology 
in Hampshire: Williams-Freeman 1915: 90). I will take it as one of the banks to be 
found in the countryside on the borders of Kent and Sussex around Down House, 
Darwin’s home. When one visits Down House, or reads much of the biographical literature around the Darwin legend, Darwin’s walks around this landscape, and in 
particular his pacing up and down his ‘thinking path’ at the bottom of the property, 
are referred to repeatedly in what is a standard trope of the history of science in which 
the intellectual journey of the lonely genius is told in terms of toil and enlightenment 
(for example the classic introduction to Darwin: Miller and Van Loon 1982; and the 
English Heritage guidebook to Down House: Morris et al. 1998). 
As such, the entangled bank may well have been a product of enclosure, a 
banked hedge thrown up in the 18th century. Banks of this kind were part of an 
historical process of commodification and privatisation of the countryside. In much of 
England, they represented a sudden break with the rural practices of the past, cutting 
across previous community-based patterns of farming the land through large open 
fields and commons within which ordinary people held a cluster of rights and mutual 
obligations. Hedging and ditching, then, marked and enforced private ownership of 
the land. For this reason, the creation of the hedges and banks of enclosure was a 
contemporary topic of engagement with Romantics, Marxists and others (Johnson 
2007: 11-14; 1996). 
Perhaps, even more suggestively, the entangled bank was one of those which 
separated Darwin’s home from the neighbouring Lubbock family estate. John 
Lubbock is routinely cited as one of the great ‘founding fathers’ of prehistoric 
archaeology; his work brought together an appreciation of time depth and the 
principles of evolution from Lyell and Darwin with the record of prehistoric stone 
tools and other implements and their parallels with ethnographic examples. Lubbock’s 
neighbourly relationship to Darwin and the relationship between Darwin’s work and 
Lubbock’s seminal Prehistoric Times are well known (Trigger 2006: 171-176), though modern Darwinian archaeologists explicitly disavow Lubbock’s governing 
model of progressive cultural evolution through stages. 
What interests me about the neighbouring Lubbock estate is that it is laid out 
according to the principles of Romanticism. It comprises grassland interspersed with 
clumps of trees, laid out across the rolling Downland. Such landscapes were 
artificially laid out, but strove to appear natural. Further, such English landscape 
gardens were held by the culture of the time to be emblematic of what were held to be 
distinctively English values of political freedom, the contrast being drawn with 
French and Italian formality and geometrical pattern, being the product of political 
tyranny and, of course, what was perceived as the pernicious and foreign influence of 
Catholicism. For many, under the influence of the 18
th century antiquarian Stukeley, 
such ‘natural’ landscapes were also a return to the appearance of the prehistoric or 
(what was held to be) Druidic landscape before the arrival of the Romans (Johnson 
1996: 149-151; Williamson 1995). 
To understand the bank in the manner of interpretive archaeology, then, is not 
to throw up one’s hands in despair at its complexity and abandon any attempt at 
explanation, but rather to engage with human history. Attempts by Darwinists to 
engage with the history of enclosure and of landscape change in the postmedieval 
period do exist, but have been faltering. There is a useful literature on the formation 
of the medieval common fields as a response to risk, and conversely on the 
dissolution of the open fields and their replacement with enclosed fields as being due 
to the growth of a market economy. The growth of markets, it is suggested, meant that 
individual farmers could always buy their food in lean years (McCloskey 1979; see 
also Dahlman 1980, and Winterhalder 1990 for a comparative view). There has also 
been a suggestion from human behavioural ecologists that the apparently ‘natural’ layout of such landscapes, with grassland interspersed with clumps of trees, appeals to 
the hard-wiring of the human brain, in that it repeats the spatial ordering of the 
African savannah (Heerwagen and Orians 1993). Neither of these attempts convince 
fully, particularly in the latter case. 
 
H1 The goals of archaeology: fundamentalism/plurality 
Is this exploration of the entangled bank anything more than an intellectual 
parlour game? I suggest that it is directly pertinent to an exploration of the goal or 
goals of archaeology. One such goal, possibly the central goal, has to be to account 
for past human behaviour in a rigorous and scientific manner. Many Darwinist 
archaeologists make the claim that it is not just another narrative to be placed 
alongside the plurality of so much of modern archaeology, a plurality which many 
Darwinist and more broadly processual writers see as potentially disabling in that it 
opens the door, in their view, to an unbridled relativism. I have argued above that 
such a claim needs to be decentered. Further, I think that this claim of scientific 
rigour, and conversely the imputation of a lack of scientific rigour to much of 
interpretive and indeed culture-historical archaeology, is paradoxical in nature. 
Scientific rigour is one of the key attractions of much Darwinist thinking and also one 
of its key weaknesses. 
Scientific rigour, or more accurately the perception of science as a single, 
fundamentally ‘correct’ way of doing things in which other ways of thinking are 
possible but cannot be placed within the domain of Science, is loaded ideologically. 
Dependening on who is speaking, rigour turns into dogmatism; method turns into 
inflexibility; principle turns into fundamentalism. Your thought is inflexible and 
dogmatic, whereas mine is rigorous; conversely, your thought is fluffy, whereas mine is flexible and eclectic. Rigour in itself, then, is not a necessarily or automatically 
desirable attribute; it is one of a linked set of rhetorical terms of praise or denigration 
whose worth depends on the observer’s viewpoint. 
More fundamentally, ‘scientific rigour’ is a zero-sum game. The more ‘rigour’ 
the archaeologist has, the less she or he can be argued to engage eclectically with the 
varied experience of the world, and the less he or she engages constructively with 
what archaeologists actually do. The most rigorous Darwinist programmes are those 
of Robert Dunnell and his students, often writing from North America, who pair a 
commitment to a Darwinist archaeology with a commitment to Science with a capital 
S (for example O’Brien 1996; Barton and Clark 1997). In such views, Darwinism 
becomes a fundamentalist and sectarian programme which, by its own affirmation, 
fails to engage with the discipline as a whole (for example in its rejection of 
traditional culture-historical concepts such as culture, phase and type, concepts which 
for better or worse continue to structure a large part of traditional field and analytical 
enquiry; O’Brien and Lyman 2002 discuss this issue). Shennan’s Genes, Memes and 
Human History is in implicit agreement with much of my assessment of the Dunnell 
school, since there is no reference to Dunnell’s writings in his book (apart from a 
single 1979 article; see Preucel 1999 for an effective critique of selectionist 
archaeology). 
The alternative, which Shennan follows and which is more characteristic of 
British writing on evolutionary archaeology, is to pursue a much looser and more 
eclectic mix of Darwinist ideas, seen also for example in the varied work of Stephen 
Mithen (2005), Clive Gamble (2007), and indeed a great many of the ‘evolutionary’ 
contributors to this volume. As a result, Shennan’s suggestions and arguments are 
more engaged and more convincing, more productive of dialogue. I fear, however, that Shennan, like all archaeologists including myself trying 
to work in the difficult space between scientific fundamentalism and a disabling 
plurality, is trying to have his cake and eat it too. Shennan holds on to a commitment 
to science, most explicitly in his rejection of empathy, prehistoric ethnography, and (it 
is implied) agency theory in the first few polemical paragraphs of his Introduction 
(2004: 9-10) and in the opening part of his paper in this volume. Shennan also asserts 
that we should play to archaeologists’ strengths – that the archaeological record is 
best suited to explorations of long-term stability and change, and conversely, unsuited 
to what he sees as ‘prehistoric ethnography’. As a scientist, my response is that I have 
no a priori expectations of what I will find in the archaeological record. We might 
indeed find patterns which suggest very long-term stability or trajectories of change, 
for example as Shennan has convincingly explored for the Palaeolithic (Shennan 
2001), or we might find evidence of sudden, qualitative transformation – as any 
appreciation of the Darwinist concept of punctuated equilibrium would affirm. It is 
difficult to stand in the middle of the ruins of the Forum in Rome, or in front of the 
north façade of Bodiam Castle, and assert on an a priori basis that an exploration of 
the values, meanings and lived experience of such monuments, and an understanding 
of agency, is somehow a less valid – or a less intellectually rigorous – requirement 
than what are often rather tortured attempts to fit such phenomena into a framework 
derived from Darwinian evolution. Whatever Shennan’s rhetoric in the first and last 
few pages of the book, the mix of ideas presented in Genes, Memes and Human 
History comes very close to abandoning any claim to scientific fundamentalism: it 
comes closer, then, to being just another narrative. Kristian Kristiansen says 
something similar when he attempts to locate both Darwinist ideas on the one hand 
and agency theory on the other not as all-encompassing explanations but rather as suited to particular phases or elements of the archaeological record (Kristiansen 
2004). 
More fundamentally, what can be called ‘the eclectic turn’ opens Darwinist 
archaeology up to the same issue that confronted Darwin and his followers in the 
period before the discovery of genetics. Shennan discusses the issue that there is no 
obvious or reliable counterpart in human culture to the idea of the gene. He explicitly 
proposes the idea of the ‘meme’ as its counterpart (2004: 7-8 and succeeding pages). 
This idea is attractive, but it is unclear how it can attain more than the status of an 
extended metaphor, however fertile or persuasive such a metaphor might be. Indeed, 
Shennan gets tired of the metaphor very quickly; it makes no appearance after page 64 
of his book. 
Such lines of argument are not ones that many interpretive archaeologists will 
have an a priori or base-line objection to: it leads archaeologists to some interesting 
explanations of particular episodes or phases of the prehistoric past. But insofar as 
they rest at their core on a metaphorical conception of reproduction through memes 
rather than genes, models of this kind implicitly retreat from any attempt or pretension 
to a single method or scientific ‘high ground’. An archaeological audience, then, is 
quite entitled to be sceptical when Darwinist arguments become excessively complex 
or counter-intuitive. Not only do such arguments abandon the scientific high ground, 
they appear to move away from the economy and simplicity which is such a hallmark 
of the best of Darwinist thought (see Layton, this volume for a similar argument). For 
example: are Bronze Age leg-chains about women’s choice in reproductive success 
(Shennan 2004: 204)? No they’re not, they’re about male domination. Is handaxe 
symmetry about male competition and display (Shennan 2004: 197-8)? No, it is about 
a recursive relationship between agency and artefact. Both these Darwinist arguments push the evidence to an interpretive distance, and propose a complexity of 
archaeological explanation, that would make the most ardent postprocessualist blush 
(see also the very complex language and equations to be found in Bentley and 
Shennan 2003, which equals the difficulty of the most ‘obscurantist’ postprocessual 
writing; or the interpretive gaps found in Kohn and Mithen 1999, where the argument 
rests on a set of interesting but unproven assertions about what early hominid 
behaviour might have been). They remind us of a much older theoretical decline and 
fall, that of Marxism, from the beauty, economy and structure of the classical Marxist 
theory of history, fashioned again in the later 19
th century, to the more complex and 
obscure later western Marxist traditions. 
A metaphorical conception of Darwinist explanation means, then, that there is 
no fundamental, base-line distinction to be made between the core nature of Darwinist 
arguments and those of interpretive archaeologies. A good example in this regard is 
Fraser Neiman’s account of ‘the lost world of Monticello’ (Neiman 2008). Shennan is 
correct to single this article out for praise as an important and compelling argument 
(Shennan, this volume). Neiman’s discussion of the economic and social strategies of 
free and enslaved peoples in the 17
th and 18
th century Chesapeake and the way these 
strategies are manifested in the archaeological record is intelligent, insightful, and 
reflects a deep understanding that comes from a lifetime working with the material. 
The trouble is, it’s not particularly Darwinist. A rigorous and even brutal editor could 
strip out from the paper elements of jargon, references to evolutionary game theory, 
rephrase ‘fitness interests’ as simply ‘interests’ and ‘demic spread’ as simply ‘spread’, 
and insist that ‘emphasising the causal connection between artifacts and their 
meaning’ (Neiman 2008: 164) does not necessarily equate to an evolutionary 
approach, any more or less than it equates to, say, a Marxist approach. Though it does not reference it, Neiman’s detailed and perceptive discussion of Monticello shares 
much in common with Upton’s discussion of different axes of status in Monticello I 
and II, and the derivation of these axes from local and vernacular traditions, with an 
emphasis on symbolic and cultural divisions (Upton 1998: 20-38). Upton’s account is 
also centred on the tensions between master and enslaved servants, and comes from 
an intellectual position within architectural, folklife and historical studies very similar 
to that of interpretive archaeology. 
The point here is not that Neiman is incorrect or somehow insincere in his 
claim to be inspired by Darwinist thinking in his interpretations. It is, rather, that there 
is no necessary contradiction between a more eclectic approach to Darwinian 
arguments and elements of interpretive archaeology. Neiman, like Shennan, makes 
strong rhetorical claims about the insufficiency of interpretive approaches to historical 
archaeology, but his objections seem to be centred on what he sees as an undue 
fragmentation of different interpretive theories and a lack of engagement with the 
archaeological record in the work of some scholars. These points are arguable and I 
have some sympathy with the implicit position taken, but they do not add up to a 
sustained demonstration of the superiority of a Darwinian historical archaeology. 
I am arguing here that we have returned to the entangled bank – that the more 
eclectic versions of Darwinism actually represent a return to an intellectual space last 
occupied by late 19
th century Darwinism before the development of genetics. Shennan 
himself comments that the book Genes, Memes and Human History “is a very 19th 
century one in the issues it addresses. If that is so, it is because the 19th century 
pioneers of anthropology asked most of the right questions” (2002: 262; he very 
sensibly avoids implying that they found anything like the right answers). For the 19th 
century, as Shennan implies, the role of anthropology, and implicitly archaeology, was to be reductionist: that is, to reduce the study of human behaviour to a single 
evolutionary scheme that could be expressed simply in terms of a few fundamental 
drivers and variables – the set of processes that produce the entangled bank. I do not 
mean to be perjorative or dismissive here; ‘reductionism’ has become, like 
‘empiricism’, ‘positivism’ or indeed ‘relativism’, a routine term of abuse that often 
serves as a poor substitute for the hard work of critique. Any attempt to explain the 
world involves a degree of reductionism, and conversely any accommodation of 
‘theory’ to ‘practice’, however defined in the human sciences, involves an 
amelioration of that reductionism. 
In many respects, though not in all, 19
th century Darwinism can be represented 
as a reaction to the concerns of the 18
th century Romanticism that produced 
Lubbock’s landscaped park. Romanticism, particularly in its more vulgarised and 
popular forms, proceeded from assertions about what human beings were, 
fundamentally, and concerned itself with questions of human essence and Man’s 
relationship to Nature. Discussion of these questions of ontology and essence, of what 
humans essentially are, their essence and relationship to the world, often bordered and 
continues to border on the metaphysical. In its vulgar forms, Romanticism habitually 
spoke about the world in emotive and mystical terms, and in particular about the 
importance of the individual and of emotional empathy between human beings 
(Wordsworth’s famous maxim was: ‘What is a Poet? A Man speaking to other Men’). 
As such, its project is largely recognisable to a modern archaeological audience, 
because the concerns of Romanticism are picked up today in interpretive archaeology 
and in much phenomenological writing. When Shennan condemns recent writing on 
phenomenology as “attempting to empathise with people’s lived experience” (2002: 
271), he is implicitly levelling the charge that interpretive archaeology is following a Romantic agenda (this argument, which I feel has some validity, is developed more 
fully in Johnson 2006 and 2007). 
What I am suggesting here is that much of the gap between interpretive and 
evolutionary approaches apparent in discussions of the goals of archaeology today 
stems in part from a replaying of much earlier debates and concerns at the genesis of 
modern archaeological enquiry in the late 18
th and 19
th centuries. This is not to imply 
that archaeological theory is going around in circles or that debate is useless; it 
implies rather that many of the questions we are concerned with in archaeology 
remain enduring ones, and these enduring concerns are about the very widest 
questions of the discipline’s role now and in the future.  Such an argument shares 
some intellectual ground with Kristansen 2008, particularly his figure 2. 
These questions are enduring because they address the same enduring 
problems. 19
th century archaeology and anthropology sprang from the twin roots of 
Romanticism and Darwinist science as two opposed but related responses to the world 
around them. European men and women saw the massive changes and 
transformations in the world around them, of industrial and agrarian revolution, the 
development of colonialism and Empire; their intellectual reaction was either to 
attempt to grasp the authentic roots of a culture and an unmediated Nature they felt 
was being left behind (the Romantic response), or to order, systematise and legitimate 
the study of human transformation into an evolutionary system and ladder. I am 
suggesting that archaeology remains, then, in the grip of these fundamentally opposed 
but also strongly related questions. However, such an observation raises a further 
issue: is archaeology fundamentally about the cultural and political concerns of the 
present or about the past? 
 H1 The goals of archaeology: past/present 
One of the points Shennan makes strongly is that archaeology has lost sight of 
its role in explaining and accounting for the past, and I think he has a point. For me, 
the central goal of archaeology is very simple: to find out about the past, through the 
study of material remains that are here with us, in the present. Further, I am interested 
in process. I want to know what factors shaped human history. I want to know why 
human social development took the path that it did. 
Such a stance is not one that is common to all strands of interpretive 
archaeology, however defined. A series of famous statements by Shanks and Tilley 
veer close to the line that archaeology is about critique in the present rather than the 
past – though in fairness, they never quite cross this line and elsewhere deny such a 
dualism should be drawn in any case: 
“6.5 Archaeology is nothing if it is not critique. 
6.5.1 We do not argue for truths about the past but argue through the 
medium of the past to detach the power of the truth from the present 
social order” (Shanks and Tilley 1987: 213; see also 1987: 189). 
Julian Thomas also shies away from such strong formulations (2000: 6-7), 
while for the Lampeter Archaeology Group (1997), no-one ever claimed to judge 
arguments on exclusively political grounds. 
There are three points to be made here. First, there is no necessary 
epistemological conflict between focus on the past or on the present. Lewis Binford 
(1987) is the first to rightly insist that we do not study the past, we study the present, 
and the position that the past is constructed by archaeologists independently of the 
present is held by only a very few hard-liners – again, it is characteristic of a mindless 
atheoretical particularism rather than by anyone engaged with theoretical debate on either side. In a sense, the choice to stress one or the other, the past or the present, is a 
rhetorical one, an act of positioning made by different people and groups for different 
reasons – which should prompt the observer, just as we have done with Darwin’s 
entangled bank, to ask about the framing of the question, to enquire why this person 
or group chooses to position themselves in such a way. Contrast these two positions 
and ask why the speakers choose to foreground certain concerns: 
“… our core strengths… are our diversity and international 
representativeness… our dedication to redressing inequality and our 
commitment to innovation, critique, experiment, and excellence. An 
appreciation of the richness obtainable from global diversity and a 
willingness to face the challenges of engaging in social justice issues are 
integral to WAC” (Smith n.d.) 
“…the main aim of archaeology is to obtain valid knowledge about the 
past…. the growth of ‘cultural heritage’ studies, important though they 
are, should [not] be allowed to displace an archaeology concerned with 
finding out about the past.” (Shennan 2002, 9). 
Second, there is an issue of plurality, or to put it another way, a hierarchy of 
knowledge. Whatever my view, or Shennan’s view, there remain other positions, and 
there remain different views on the extent to which archaeologists could or should 
attempt to marginalise, ‘redline’ or shut these other positions down. This concern is 
seen most explicitly with issues relating to indigenous archaeology or with theoretical 
voices outside the English-speaking world. The pretty routine position taken by 
interpretive archaeology is to endorse plurality, but I do want to raise a concern with 
this: an unthinking plurality or ‘tolerance’ can lead, in practice, to a refusal to take 
other positions seriously and a slide into an archaeology which refuses to challenge or critique. This point was made by Shanks and Tilley in critique of Hodder back in the 
1980s and surfaces indirectly in Marxist attacks on postmodernism’s endorsement of 
plurality; it is a position hinted at by Maria Berglund (2004). 
The limits to plurality can be seen in the ‘debate’ over intelligent design. Both 
Darwinists and interpretive theorists have a problem with intelligent design. Steven 
Jones has famously given up attempting to debate with creationists, a failure he 
attributed to their intellectual obstinacy, but which to the outside observer suggests 
that something deeper is going on here. Darwinists have nothing to say to its 
proponents. ‘Postmodern relativism’ is often accused of creating an interpretive space 
within which intelligent design can be given ‘equal status’ (for example Gross and 
Levitt 1997). But it is difficult to point to a single postmodernist who explicitly 
endorses any kind of intellectual credence being given to such arguments. Conversely, 
however, interpretive responses fail to convince; the criteria by which indigenous 
groups are encouraged in a plurality of views and yet religious fundamentalists are 
denied analogous rights remain quite unclear, except on the grounds of judgments 
made in the political present (see the discussion in Layton 2002). Proponents of 
intelligent design themselves use a rhetoric that draws from both sides – it is laden 
with scientific jargon, yet makes powerful appeals to ‘teach the debate’; it has been 
suggested by cultural anthropologists that it is precisely this political flexibility that 
accounts in part for the greater success of creationism in North America (Coleman 
and Carlin 2002). 
Third, there is an issue of history, or more loosely a consciousness that 
archaeology is never produced in a cultural or political vacuum. Again, we return to 
the late 19
th century context of Darwinist thought, and its association with racist and 
other politically repugnant standpoints, for example in the work of Pitt Rivers. Most would agree that moral condemnation of such forms of politics is no substitute for 
serious and empirically informed analysis of statements made about the past. Equally, 
however, most would I think reject the other end of this spectrum, the empiricist 
fallacy – that is, that accounts of the past can be evaluated in a vacuum, completely 
independently of present cultural and political conditions. 
What this means, I think, in terms of the goals of archaeology, is that the 
question of whether archaeology is ‘fundamentally’ about present or past is a 
philosophical red herring. This does not mean that it is unimportant. The rhetorical 
strength with which Shennan and others question recent stress on heritage, when 
compared with the rhetorical strength with which activists in WAC foreground 
political issues, is telling us something very important about the nature of intellectual 
life today. I’ll return to this point in the Conclusion. 
 
H1 The goals of archaeology: human beings 
A second element of the 19
th century divergence is in its understanding of 
human beings. One of the most frequent clichés in archaeology is that its goal is to 
understand human beings, not artefacts (though it has to be said that such claims 
invariably come on the last page of books otherwise utterly devoid of human interest 
or understanding). Arguably, such a goal was central to New Archaeology, most 
obviously in the citation of Willey and Phillips’ dictum that ‘archaeology is 
anthropology or it is nothing’, referred to in Binford’s classic article Archaeology as 
anthropology (1962: 217; Flannery’s selection of the ecosystem behind both the 
‘Indian’ and the artefact gives a rather different emphasis; 1967: 120). It is also found 
in many versions of interpretive archaeologies, most obviously forms of agency 
theory; and it is a position I am passionately committed to. However, it is not central to all forms and one might point to a tension between an agent-centred approach 
derived from the work of Giddens and the anti-humanism present in strands of 
Derrida and Foucault’s work. (Foucault was not in my view an unqualified anti-
humanist; he traced the different ways the human subject was constituted within 
different discursive formations, but never denied the existence of a human subject). A 
common tactic is to deny the human/object dualism by asserting, in different ways, 
that objects have agency, a position that usually traces its intellectual ancestry back to 
the work of Alfred Gell (for example, Sillar 2004) and/or actor network theory 
(Latour 2005; see also Gardner, this volume). 
I think that there is a potential convergence here between certain forms of 
postprocessualism and evolutionary archaeology. The decentering of the human 
subject that is so central to poststructuralist and postmodern thought is most 
powerfully demonstrated not by Derridean critique, but rather by the concrete history 
of human evolution. The archaeology of early hominid species carries the powerful 
message that there is no essential core to being human; it is the emergence and 
development of a combination of a number of different traits, with a process of 
Darwinian selection acting partially or totally upon this development (Gamble 2007). 
And if that process is a partly contingent one , then it could be argued that there is no 
necessary essence to humanity – a strikingly postmodern and anti-essentialist 
conclusion that has been reached by a Darwinist argument. I’ll return to this question 
in my Conclusion. 
Genes, Memes and Human History approaches the question of human beings 
in a more direct way: in parts, it advocates a return to culture history and artefact 
typology, most obviously in its visual language. Several diagrams show development 
and evolution of artefacts almost as if the pots have developed little legs and are running around (as well as little genitalia and are reproducing genetically/memetically 
modified versions of themselves). His intellectual project, then, ends up being 
profoundly opposed to early New Archaeology in this sense, whereas interpretive 
archaeologies are the direct descendant of New Archaeology (also in early New 
Archaeology’s confidence to say things about past lifeworlds, which Shennan rejects 
as an attempt to do prehistoric ethnographies). 
Now of course, culture history always paid lip-service to human beings: ‘the 
Indian behind the artifact’. But in practice, it tends not to do so. For Mortimer 
Wheeler, ex-director of the Institute of Archaeology: “dead archaeology is the driest 
dust that blows” (1954: 13). But Wheeler’s work avoided dead archaeology not by 
reformulating culture history, but I would argue because his genius transcended the 
theoretical limitations of the intellectual framework. 
 
H1 Conclusion: the discipline’s role in the present and in the future 
Surely, if the discipline has any role now and in the future, it is to engage with 
concrete issues at points where different dualities meet: present and past; 
culture/politics and scientific knowledge; human culture and natural environment.  
Whatever one’s theoretical views, archaeology holds a very privileged 
position in the humanities and sciences. It enjoys an intellectual and cultural space 
where instead of asserting a priori notions about what makes us human, they can be 
subjected to empirical investigation. What is interesting in this context is the rather 
hoary old point that archaeological theory of whatever stripe has relatively little 
impact on practice, and more broadly, little impact on the public perception and role 
of archaeology in contemporary debates. This view is debateable, but insofar as it 
holds any validity we can point towards a striking common ground between interpretive and Darwinist approaches. Both make extremely strong claims for their 
intellectual importance, yet neither have had the wider impact that such claims, if true, 
might warrant. 
Clifford Geertz wrote many years ago that the debate over relativism in 
anthropology was an exchange of worries rather than a meaningful engagement of 
views (Geertz 1984). What I have tried to show in this paper is that the debate over 
Darwinist and interpretive ideas has very deep roots of at least a century and a half. 
What I am proposing for the future, then, is that it is surely an overdue time to move 
away from an exchange of worries to a substantive exploration of past humanity. 
Perhaps, beneath the discursive consciousness of the archaeological community, this 
is already happening; perhaps this is why, since the postprocessual polemics of the 
1980s, there has been no further (claimed) revolutionary change in archaeological 
thought. If so, what we have seen is not intellectual stagnation, but the developing 
maturity of the discipline. 
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